Showing posts with label Amendment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Amendment. Show all posts

March 3, 2015

Tennessee v. Kennedy & Tennessee v. Wells – Blood Draws and the Fourth Amendment

Two Tennessee cases were recently decided concerning the constitutionality of mandatory blood draws of those accused of driving under the influence (DUI). This legal issue is highlighted in Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals cases, State v. Kennedy

[1] and State v. Wells.[2] Both cases discuss at length the constitutionality of the Implied Consent statute, Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A) § 55-10-406(f)(2) in relation to Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Generally, T.C.A. § 55-10-406(a) provides that “[a]ny person who drives a motor vehicle in this state (Tennessee) is deemed to have given consent to a test or tests” contingent upon the “law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving under the influence [(DUI or DWI)] of alcohol, drugs, any other intoxicant or any combination of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants.”[3] This Driving Under the Influence (DUI), also know as Driving While Impaired (DWI), statute fails to specifically mention a requirement for a search warrant before such a forced blood draw occurs.
The subsection discussed by the Court, T.C.A. § 55-10-406(f)(2), requires Tennessee law enforcement officers in some circumstances to “cause the driver to be tested for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of the driver’s blood.”[4] Regardless of the driver’s consent, law enforcement officers may forcibly draw blood with probable cause to believe that the driver has committed vehicular homicide while intoxicated,[5] aggravated vehicular homicide,[6] or a multiple offense DUI violation.[7]
The Fourth Amendment guarantees:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”[8]
The “exclusionary rule,”[9] enforces the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by presuming warrantless seizures are unreasonable and the seized evidence may be suppressed at trial.[10] Warrant requirements may only be waived through exigent circumstances or recognized exceptions.[11] Generally recognized exceptions include “search[es] incident to arrest, plain view, stop and frisk, hot pursuit, search under exigent circumstances, and…consent to search.”[12] The Supreme Court has held that “exigent circumstances” should be determined by the “totality of the circumstances.”[13]
James Otis, a young colonial era attorney, was an initial proponent of the Fourth Amendment’s warranty requirement.[14] Mr. Otis defended colonists against British authorities using “writs of assistance” to conduct searches—even without suspicion.[15] Despite an unfavorable outcome at trial, Founding Father John Adams endearingly labeled “the dispute as the spark of the American Revolution: ‘Then and there was the child ‘Independence’ born.’”[16] Since the Fourth Amendment’s implementation in 1789, it has served as the most prolific source of constitutional litigation in American history.[17]
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights, which originally only applied to the federal government, to the individual states.[18] In part, it mandated that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”.[19] Due Process rights have two interpretations: procedural and substantive due process rights.[20] Procedural due process guarantees a fair legal process when the government or state burdens an individual’s protected interest in “life, liberty, or property;” whereas substantive due process guarantees that the government will not encroach citizens’ fundamental rights.[21]
In State v. Kennedy
,[22] Fairview City Police Department officers followed the defendant home after recognizing his driver’s license as revoked.[23] The officer testified he detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage and found defendant’s “eyes to be watery.”[24] The defendant was subsequently transported to the local police station where he refused both Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) and a blood alcohol content (BLAC) test.[25] Thus, he was taken to the Williamson County Medical Center for a phlebotomist to conduct a mandatory blood draw. No warrant was obtained prior to this procedure because efforts to obtain one would have made “the streets of Fairview less safe.”[26] During trial, the court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the blood draw’s results and ruled that since T.C.A. § 55-10-406(f)(2) “created a per se exception to the warrant requirement, it violated the state and federal constitutions.”[27]
On interlocutory appeal, the State sought to reverse the blood draw’s suppression and argued that T.C.A. § 55-10-406(f)(2) “does not create an unconstitutional per se exception to the federal warrant requirement and that, in any event, exigent circumstances justified the taking of the defendant’s blood.”[28] Here, however, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the State’s argument of “less safe” streets did not constitute exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless seizure of defendant’s blood.[29] The court also ruled that T.C.A. § 55-10-406(f)(2) is “open to the interpretation that a warrant is required before a mandatory blood draw when a suspect refuses to consent to the draw.”[30] Thus, the court upheld the statute as constitutional.[31]
Similarly, in State v. Wells
,[32] the defendant was charged with DUI, among other offenses, after wrecking his vehicle into a building.[33] Upon his apprehension in a nearby gas station, the defendant refused law enforcement’s request for a blood test.[34] Despite this refusal, and absent a warrant, law enforcement officers proceeded to transport the defendant to a nearby hospital for a mandatory blood test.[35] During trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights—the trial court agreed and granted the motion.[36] Also, the trial court ruled that T.C.A. § 55-10-406(f)(2) was unconstitutional based on its per se exception to a warrant requirement.[37] Upon appeal, the State argued that exigent circumstances justified the blood draw without a warrant; however, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed that sufficient exigent circumstances did not exist but reversed the lower court’s ruling that the statute was unconstitutional.[38]
The court considered whether the implied consent law under T.C.A. § 55-10-406(a) provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.[39] Favoring the defendant, the court held “[t]he state cannot, through legislation, strip an accused of constitutional rights” and that drawing the defendant’s blood without a warrant was contrary to Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees.[40] Similar to State v. Kennedy
, the court found that without the accused’s consent or a warrant, and absent exigent circumstances, as was the case here, the state could not conduct a blood draw.[41] However, the court upheld the statute as constitutional since it “did not mandate a blood draw in violation of the Fourth Amendment” and its “silence did not dispense with the warrant requirement.”[42]
Looking forward, the general rule to be gleaned from the aforementioned cases is that without the accused’s consent or a search warrant, and absent exigent circumstances or a generally accepted warrant exception, the state cannot conduct a forced blood draw.

About the Author: Steven Oberman has been licensed in Tennessee since 1980, and successfully defended over 2,000 DUI defendants.  Among the many honors bestowed upon him, Steve served as Dean of the National College for DUI Defense, Inc. and currently serves as chair of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers DUI Committee.  Steve was the first lawyer in Tennessee to be certified as a DUI Defense Specialist by the Tennessee Commission on Continuing Legal Education and Specialization and the NCDD.
He is the author of DUI: The Crimes & Consequences in Tennessee, updated annually since 1991 (Thomson-West), and co-author with Lawrence Taylor of the national treatise, Drunk Driving Defense, 7th edition (Wolters Kluwer/Aspen).  Steve has served as an adjunct professor at the University of Tennessee Law School since 1993 and has received a number of prestigious awards for his faculty contributions.  He is a popular international speaker, having spoken at legal seminars in 26 states, the District of Columbia and three foreign countries.
You may contact Steve through his website at www.tndui.com or by telephone at (865) 249-7200.
The author would also like to recognize and thank Matt Wayne, a second year law student at the University of Tennessee College of Law, for his research and editing contributions of this article.
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February 7, 2015

Series: Consent as an Exception to the Fourth Amendment

Posted on January 20, 2015 by Chuck Ramsay

Photo via Bruce Bortin/FlickrNearly two years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Missouri v. McNeely that police must obtain a search warrant in most DWI alcohol test cases because the dissipation of alcohol in the body is not enough to make an exception to the warrant requirement. Last year, in State v. Brooks, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on a judicially-crafted exception to the warrant requirement when it held that police in Minnesota do not need to obtain a search warrant when a driver “freely and voluntarily” consents to a DWI alcohol test (and yes, every type of DWI test, whether it's by blood, breath, or urine, is most definitely a constitutionally protected search). 

At first glance, the concept of consent – you ask me for permission and I say yes or no – seems simple and straightforward. Through the looking glass of the legal system, however, consent is complicated. In the world of DWI chemical testing, consent has become one of Minnesota’s most litigated issues, both at the district court level, in the appellate courts . . . and even in federal court.

The approach of Minnesota's courts towards this issue of "consent" arises from the blurring of two concepts: consent and submission. Under current Minnesota law, submission can be legally compelled; submission to DWI testing is required by law and refusal to submit is a crime. Consent, on the other hand, must be intentional, free, and voluntary, and cannot be coerced or compelled by law. By definition, consent to search is the free and voluntary waiver of the fundamental constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches. When actual consent to a warrantless search is freely and voluntarily given to law enforcement by an individual, a warrantless search is constitutional. (Even then, though, the individual retains the right to withdraw consent at any time, as well as limit the scope of the consent.)

Consent is the critical issue because without free and voluntary consent, a search – even one the law requires you to submit to – is unconstitutional. When submission is required by law, how do we differentiate consent?

This is the introductory post of our blog series, Consent as an Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement: DWI Alcohol Testing. In our upcoming posts we'll discuss:  

1. The History of the Consent Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement

2. The Evolution of the Consent Search Doctrine 

3. Minnesota’s New Standard for the Consent Exception to the Fourth Amendment: State v. Brooks 

4. Consent as a Matter of Law: The Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Consent Exception to the Fourth Amendment

5. The Constitutional Implications of Minnesota’s New Standard for the Consent Exception to the Fourth Amendment

6. The Future of the Consent Search Doctrine

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January 31, 2015

The History of the Consent Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement

Home > Fourth Amendment > The History of the Consent Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant RequirementPosted on January 23, 2015 by Chuck Ramsay

http://www.keepcalm-o-matic.co.uk/p/keep-calm-and-ask-for-consent-3/The Constitution didn't come with built-in exceptions; courts have created them. It wasn't until 1921, in Amos v. United States, that the United States Supreme Court first recognized the possibility of a consent exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement. It took another 25 years, in Zap v. United States, for the Court to turn the possibility into a reality. Before 1946, you couldn't waive your right to a warrant even if you wanted to; every search had to be authorized by a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause. The writers of our Constitution knew all-too-well the danger posed to personal liberty by unchecked, unilateral action by one branch of government. Hence, the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement.

Given our nation’s belief in individual freedom, it makes sense that a warrantless search is reasonable when it is conducted with the permission of the person searched. In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. When police officers ask an individual for consent to search, it reinforces the rule of law for the individual to actually consent (or refuse to consent), and for the police to act in accordance, by executing the consensual search (or getting a warrant). That's why, when the Court created the consent search exception in the 1946 Zap case, the Court relied on actual consent; an individual had to give an intentional, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his or her Fourth Amendment rights before a search would be considered consensual. Only the truly voluntary relinquishment of the right to a warrant could support the constitutionality of a warrantless search.

Actual consent – “Yes, I give you permission to search” or “No, come back with a warrant” – remained the benchmark for about 50 years. Then, in 1973, the Court issued its decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. In that case, the Court developed a new approach to the consent search doctrine by shifting the criteria for consent from actual, express consent given freely and intentionally, to "consent" as determined by the court's application of a “voluntariness” test to "the totality of the circumstances."

The significance of this shift cannot be overstated; after Bustamonte, actual, express consent (or refusal to consent) was no longer determinative. Even when there was no actual, express consent, the courts began to find "consent" by asking not whether an individual consented, but rather whether a reasonable officer would have construed the individual's actions as consent. As of 1976, courts could find "consent" as a matter of law even when there was no actual, express, voluntary consent as a matter of fact.

In Bustamonte, the Court separated consent search analysis from the original characteristics that made consent searches reasonable. Instead of focusing on the individual’s actual consent to forego a constitutional protection as the basis for the doctrine, the Court emphasized the balance between law enforcement officials’ interest in conducting searches and the private citizen’s fear of coercion. This new focus on law enforcement interests moved the doctrine of the consent search exception away from an objective standard, which focused on a particular person’s actual waiver of his or her constitutional right, to a subjective standard, which assessed whether a law enforcement officer’s actions coerced the suspect into permitting a warrantless search. "Consent" was determined by the one asking for it, not the one giving it.

Law enforcement has no complaints about this shift, but for individuals, the consent search situation has only gone downhill since Bustamonte. Subsequent court decisions have further distanced the consent search exception from its original justification by shifting the focus of consent analysis entirely away from the objective, actual manifestation of an individual’s consent to the court's interpretation of the facts from the officer’s perspective in the absence of express consent. In a recent case here in Minnesota, the Court of Appeals found free and voluntary consent from a 21-year veteran of our U.S. Navy, even when the veteran told the officer who arrested him “I guess I will take your test, but I am not consenting.” This approach goes far beyond cases that have come before, and appears to be ushering in a new consent calculation: submission to a search automatically equals consent to that search.

This plays out in a dangerous way in the context of warrantless DWI searches: the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory says "Minnesota law requires you to submit to a chemical test" and "refusal to submit is a crime." The Advisory doesn't mention the fact that if a driver refuses, no test will be performed against his will. And law enforcement is not required to clarify that a driver can (and must) submit to a warrantless search to obey the law without giving free and voluntary consent to that warrantless search.

What if the Implied Consent Advisory said "Minnesota law requires you to submit to a haircut" and "refusing to submit to a haircut is a crime"? You'd submit to the haircut to avoid the crime, even if you didn't want a haircut, right? You might even say, "I’ll submit to this haircut because it's the only way I can avoid committing a crime, but I am not consenting to this haircut.” And it logically follows that you'd refuse to submit to a haircut if you could do so without committing a crime. Well, according to Minnesota law, in that situation you freely and voluntarily consented to the haircut.

Keep checking back - up next in this six part series we'll explore the continuing evolution of the "consent search" doctrine.

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February 10, 2011

Random Boat Stops and the 4th Amendment

Posted on May 1, 2007 by Ken Gibson § 31.124 of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code states, “an enforcement officer may stop and board a vessel . . . and may inspect the boat” to determine whether it is in compliance with the various provisions of the Code.

What this means for the average lake-goer is that an officer has the power to stop his or her boat without probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Basically, a law enforcement officer may board any boat, for absolutely any reason and, once aboard, may legally come into contact with evidence of a possible crime, like boating while intoxicated.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas recently discussed whether or not this statute violates the 4th Amendment’s ban on illegal searches. The court held in Schenekl v. State that it does not.

It may be difficult to understand how a random stop, unsupported by probable cause, could be constitutional. The court, in making this determination, applied a two-prong test, weighing the State’s interest in the search against the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement.

The court held that the State has a strong interest in protecting its citizens and promoting water safety through random safety checks. The court decided that, in contrast, the level of intrusion to the individual during a random boat stop is minimal.

Thus, while it may seem counter-intuitive, the court held random safety checks of boats to be constitutional and not a violation of the 4th Amendment. This information is certainly important to keep in mind while spending time at the lake this spring and summer.

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The acronyms DUI, DWI, OMVI and OVI all refer to the same thing: operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The most commonly used terms are DUI, an acronym for Driving Under the Influence, and DWI, an acronym for Driving While Impaired.
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